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logical sources. Instructors will, I think, enjoy taking
issue with it just as much as students will. Ordered
Universes is a product of considerable experience,
scholarship, and long reflection that will elicit seri-
ous engagement from all readers.
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This book describes the characteristics of a
number of "women's religions," sometimes called
"female-dominated religions." Among these are an-
cestral cults of Black Caribs in contemporary Be-
lize, the indigenous religion of the RyQkyQ Islands,
the zar cult of northern Africa, Christian Science,
Shakerism, the Feminist Spirituality Movement in
20th-century United States, and a number of others.
The data collected here are interesting and clearly
worth serious consideration.
There are, of course, certain problems of defini-
tion in such an approach, notably the creation
thereby of a residual category of "men's religions"
(p. 12); because Catholicism is a "men's religion,"
there is no place in this book for, say, Mother Ther-
esa. The author asserts that she is committed to the
idea that "religious beliefs are not inscribed on the
X or Y chromosomes" (p. 7), and states that she is a
"feminist anthropologist" (p. 35). Yet she regularly
makes what seem to this reader to be essentialist as-
sertions about religious and other sorts of behavior
of "women," many of which seem at least arguable
if not dubious. Although such essential isms may
characterize certain varieties of feminism, this is
hardly acceptable anthropology. We are told that
the Shakers, for instance, had an "ordered life style
[that] was particularly compelling for women" (p.
25). We are also told that "women's overwork,
burn-out, and frustration often lead to chronic ail-
ments which do not respond either to modern or
herbal medicine" (p. 105). In addition, "grounded
in particular relationships with particular children,
mothers are unlikely to find a wholly other-worldly
religion appealing" (p. 149). Finally, "mothers
quickly learn that absolutes are useless in dealing
with the vagaries of intimate human relationship"
(p. 158): the author did not know my mother.
This book, then, is not theoretically satisfying. It
does collect a broad range of interesting informa-
tion on religion, women, and mothers, but the
conceptualization of these data remains an open
problem.
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The Kingdom of Individuals offers a stimulating
set of reflections on the limits to our understanding
of human experience derived from a focus on insti-
tutions, collectivities, and the rituals and symbols
that go with them. Drawing on a career that began
with fteldwork in a peasant community in highland
India in the 1950s, Bailey approaches the under-
standing of human beings largely through the lens
of self-interest, whether exercised in the political or
economic arenas. What makes this book particu-
larly interesting is that although his analysis of indi-
viduality is shaped by this lens, he also explores the
limits to self-interest as an explanatory frame.
Primarily, Bailey's analysis endeavors to show
that although an institution or a collectivity is con-
cerned to contain individuals and to use their ener-
gies for its own purposes, the very nature of its at-
tempts to do this through coercion or convention
inspire individual "disengagement" from the collec-
tivity. Institutions are, of course, directed by human
beings, and while one purpose of an institution
might be efficient production, its leaders are also
concerned to manipulate and dominate. Thus some
of the examples of disengagement he describes are
concerned with finding room within an institution
for uses of time that seem more interesting to an in-
dividual. Other forms of disengagement assert the
resistance of the individual to being manipulated or
display the knowledge that power is necessarily in-
volved in institutional life even if the individual is
formally powerless within it.
In this analysis individuality is associated with
freedom, conscience, and "cogitation"; institutions
with order, duty, and emotion. Institutional activi-
ties are either efficient, in terms of their purpose, or
ritualistic. This separation is rather too clear-cut to
encompass my experience of institutions. It relies
too heavily on a functional explanation of institu-
tions, namely that their reason for existing is to
serve a productive purpose. This emphasis on func-
tion and production also leads to the personifica-
tion of the institution: it has needs, and "the organi-
zation's goal . . . is to inhibit the calculation of
self-interest, the notion in individual members that
they might have an identity which is distinct from
and sometimes in competition with the organiza-
tion which encompasses them" (p. 61).
Bailey does not ignore the fact that most of
us—particularly in the industrialized, capitalist
world—participate in a number of collectivities,
and indeed he talks of the ability of a collective to
capitalize on the habit of loyalty built up in indi-
viduals through their prior experience of other col-
lectivities (as well as their need to ensure that indi-
viduals give this particular collective their full
attention). All of this would make a certain sense if
collectives were distinct entities, if there really were
a spatial boundary between the individual and the
institution, and if individuals and institutions really
were competing for the same space (or time). Such
competition, and the view that social life offers no
zero-sum games—that there is always a hierarchy,
always someone who dominates, and someone
who is dominated—is taken for granted in Bailey's
analysis. In this case, the someone is "the institu-
tion," "the collectivity." This personification, linked
with an inherent opposition to individuality (tofree-
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